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ABSTRACT 
Imagine that you have been entrusted with private 
data, such as corporate product information, sensitive 
government information, or symptom and treatment 
information about hospital patients. You may want to 
issue queries whose result will combine private and 
public data, but private data must not be revealed. 
GhostDB is an architecture and system to achieve 
this. You carry private data in a smart USB key (a 
large Flash persistent store combined with a tamper 
and snoop-resistant CPU and small RAM). When the 
key is plugged in, you can issue queries that link 
private and public data and be sure that the only 
information revealed to a potential spy is which 
queries you pose. Queries linking public and private 
data entail novel distributed processing techniques on 
extremely unequal devices (standard computer and 
smart USB key). This paper presents the basic 
framework to make this all work intuitively and 
efficiently. 
Keywords: Privacy, Secure device, Storage model. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
People give privacy up very easily, mostly assuming 
nothing can be done [23]. Patients reveal personal 
data for benefits such as emergency health care, only 
to find later that this same data ends up in insurance 
databases or at companies such as ChoicePoint or 
Intelius1. MySQL’s ‘Database in the Sky’ vision is the 
next step toward spreading personal data in the public 
place. Directives and laws related to the safeguard of 
personal information [9], [25]  slow the flow without 
stopping it. This 30 year old problem [21] is partly 
                                                                 
1 ChoicePoint: http://www.choicepoint.com 
Intelius: http://www.intelius.com 
 
technological – private data is replicated to barely 
protected computers from which it finds its way 
through spyware or simple email to the highest 
bidder. The main recent change in this picture is that 
agencies and enterprises are now criminally liable in 
case of private information leaks. 
Traditional security procedures do not offer the 
expected armor plating [6]. Recent research does 
promise additional guarantees under specific 
assumptions regarding where the trust resides in the 
system. Hippocratic databases ensure that personal 
data are used in compliance with the purpose for 
which the donor gave his consent [1] but require the 
database server to be trusted. Encrypted databases 
require either trusting the server [13], [19] or the 
clients [7], [11] depending on the place decryption 
occurs. Databases can be entirely hosted in secure 
hardware [4], [19], [27] but this solution applies only 
to very small single-user databases. Finally, an 
alternative solution can be anonymizing the data [16], 
[24] at the price of lesser data accuracy and usability. 
We propose a very different approach to protect 
sensitive data. The basic idea is to remove all 
sensitive data from internet-accessible places and 
allocate that data to trusted devices with strong 
guarantees against spying. Let us consider the 
following scenario. Bob is a traveling salesman and is 
entrusted with sensitive corporate information about 
customers and technical specifications. Sometimes he 
would like to look at his data at customer sites, on a 
customer computer or on his spyware-prone laptop. 
Bob may want to issue queries that combine public, 
say company’s product catalog, and sensitive private 
information about Bob’s customers and products’ 
specifications, but he wants to be sure the sensitive 
data is not leaked, even if he doesn’t trust the 
computing environment.  
We propose the following mode of operation: Bob 
carries around a smart USB key (a tamper-resistant 
token with a processor, a small secured RAM and a 
large persistent store) containing the private data. 
When the key is plugged in, Bob can issue SQL 
queries that link private and public data. Query 
processing algorithms on the key manage query 
execution on both the key and the powerful personal 
computer to which the key is attached. The algorithms 
ensure that private data never leaves Bob’s key, 
though public data may enter the key.  
In eventual deployment Bob needs a secure rendering 
platform. This could be the key itself (some smart 
memory sticks already hold a small LCD screen), 
possibly improved by technologies such as carbon 
fiber [8]. This could also be an external palm-style 
screen or tablet connected to the key or even the 
screen of the terminal the key is plugged into if a 
secure channel can be established with the video card 
(Digital Right Management companies are 
investigating this solution). Another mode of 
operation is sending the result to a remote secure 
application through a secure socket connection. 
Whichever the choice, the net effect is that Bob 
reveals to a potential spy only the queries he poses 
and the visible data transmitted. 
Whereas Bob works in an obviously untrusted 
environment, most people who handle sensitive data 
do so as well. The availability of spyware, the 
uncertain incentives of system administrators, and the 
internet make data leaks from general purpose 
computers all too likely. By controlling the computing 
environment and the direction of information flow, 
GhostDB provides a mechanism to ensure that those 
with a legitimate need to know private data are the 
only ones who see it.  
Unfortunately, the security of the smart USB key, and 
thus, the security of the whole approach is obtained at 
the price of hardware constraints (mainly a limited 
RAM). The privacy preservation problem thus 
translates to a severe performance problem that can be 
overcome only with the help of special storage and 
query processing techniques. 
The principal novelties described in this paper follow 
directly from this challenge: (1) how to declare which 
data should be visible and hidden simply and how to 
query it, (2) how to index the data, and (3) which 
query processing strategies to use to link public and 
private data hosted on extremely unequal devices 
(standard computer and smart USB key). Our 
philosophy is to make the user’s life as easy as 
possible (so (1) is very simple for users, database 
application programmers and administrators) while 
efficiently supporting SQL queries on arbitrarily large 
databases. Efficiency considerations on the small 
RAM Secure USB key will lead us to the design of 
generalized join indexes, Bloom filters for 
approximate filtering, the postponement of selections 
until after joins in certain cases, and algorithms that 
reflect the differences in read/write performance in the 
Secure USB key. Our experiments illustrate the 
benefits of our novel techniques on both synthetic and 
real data. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains 
how visible and hidden data are declared and queried, 
and giving the hardware constraints of the Secure 
USB key, precise the problem addressed. Section 3 
introduces a new indexation model and shows how to 
exploit it to execute selections and joins linking 
visible and hidden data. Section 4 focuses on the 
execution of projections. Section 5 tackles aggregate 
computation. Section 6 illustrates the combination of 
all operators in a query execution plan. Section 7 
presents our experiments and section 8 concludes. 
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
2.1 Data Placement: Visible on Untrusted; 
Hidden on Secure 
To clarify roles, we call the powerful but insecure 
general purpose storage and processing environment 
Untrusted, and the USB key Secure. To reflect our 
intended uses of the data at hand, we call the public 
data Visible and the sensitive Hidden. Hidden data are 
assumed to be downloaded to Secure through a secure 
channel (e.g., using secure socket layer or a USB key 
burned by the database owner and periodically 
delivered to the authorized users to carry updates).  
Specifying which data is Visible and which is Hidden 
occurs at the schema definition stage. All data is by 
default Visible. In the create table statement, either 
entire tables or entire columns may be declared 
Hidden (we have considered but rejected more 
complex specifications, because ease of use is a 
primary goal for us). For example, in a patient 
database, the patient primary key, age and city may be 
Visible, but the patient's name and body mass index 
are Hidden. This is expressed simply as follows: 
CREATE TABLE Patients ( 
id int, name char(200) HIDDEN, 
age int,  city char(100), 
bodymassindex float HIDDEN) 
The declaration of Hidden attributes in a table leads to 
a vertical partitioning of this table between Untrusted 
and Secure with primary keys replicated on both sides.  
In practice, a large part of the database can be Visible 
without compromising sensitive data. For example, a 
design guideline could be to declare as Hidden the 
foreign key attributes of all tables as well as attributes 
whose combination could be used to identify 
individuals (i.e., quasi-identifiers) and let the rest of 
the tables and attributes remain Visible. Following 
this guideline, one can specify a database where most 
Hidden data consists of keys linking Visible tuples. 
Then, Visible data, such as comments about 
treatments, reveal nothing about individuals when 
their relationship to identifiers and quasi-identifiers 
are hidden. The primary technical problem addressed 
in this paper concerns query processing, however, and 
so we reserve a full discussion of database design 
considerations to future work.  
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture and mode of 
operation of GhostDB. Queries are issued on the 
personal computer and transmitted as a whole to the 
Secure USB key. Depending on the query, a portion 
of Visible data is then requested by the PC (Visible 
data can be stored on the PC and/or on remote 
server(s)) and enters the Secure USB key. All 
executions involving Hidden data or the combination 
of Hidden and Visible data occur on the Secure USB 
key. Neither hidden data nor intermediate results ever 
leave that device in the clear. 
While this strategy induces the transmission of a 
potentially large portion of Visible data, it guarantees 
that no Hidden data can be inferred by observing the 
transferred Visible data. Indeed, that portion is 
determined only by the user query (supposed to be visible).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: GhostDB architecture and mode of 
operation. 
Queries will be expressed in SQL as usual. Queries 
involving only Visible attributes are executed on 
Untrusted with no required interaction with Secure. 
Queries linking Visible and Hidden data entail 
communication from Untrusted to Secure. For 
example: 
SELECT * FROM Patients 
WHERE age=50 and bodymassindex=23 
would entail a query on Untrusted based on age that 
delivers a list of IDs to Secure. Secure will intersect 
that list with the IDs generated from the 
bodymassindex selection. The above query is 
straightforward to process as are all mono-table 
selections. However, it incurs transferring irrelevant 
Visible data to Secure. This flow of irrelevant data 
cannot be reduced without information leakage about 
Hidden data.  
 
 
2.2 Hardware constraints 
Secure acquires its tamper resistance from a secure 
chip. Secure chips appear today in a wide variety of 
form factors ranging from smart cards to chips 
embedded in smart phones and various forms of 
pluggable secure tokens [12]. Whatever the form 
factor, secure chips share several hardware 
commonalities. They are typically equipped with a 32 
bit RISC processor (clocked at about 50 MHz), 
memory modules composed of ROM, static RAM 
(tens of KB) and a small quantity of internal stable 
storage and security modules. Security factors imply 
that the RAM must be small – the smaller the silicon 
die, the most difficult it is to snoop or tamper with 
processing. In this paper, we consider a form factor 
combining a secure chip with a large external Flash 
memory (Gigabyte sized) on a USB key having a 
USB2.0 full speed2 communication throughput [21]. 
Figure 2 illustrates this architecture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2: Secure Computing Environment is a 
smart USB key. 
                                                                 
2 The USB2.0 full speed reaches 12Mb/s. USB2.0 High speed (up 
to 480 Mb/s) is envisioned for future platforms to cope with 
applications like on-the-fly video decryption [21].  
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2.3 Problem formulation 
The hardware constraints of the secure USB key 
transform the privacy preservation problem into a 
severe performance problem. Because GhostDB 
works in a mono-user environment on the secure USB 
key, simple queries (e.g., mono-table selections) and 
updates are of little concern provided response time 
can be limited to a few seconds, which is the case. 
The first technical challenge is to support regular SQL 
queries (concentrating here on Select-Project-Join 
queries) in order to render the performance of 
GhostDB acceptable even for large databases. The 
second technical challenge is to mix visible and 
hidden computations efficiently. To handle these two 
problems, we consider three design rules expressed below: 
• Ensure that query processing techniques respect 
the fact that little RAM is available. Indeed, the 
device has limited RAM for security 
considerations. Swapping encrypted Hidden data 
on Untrusted could be a solution but is more 
expensive (encryption/decryption costs) than using 
the Flash memory. 
• Minimize the impact of irrelevant Visible data on 
Secure processing. As said above, irrelevant 
Visible data cannot be filtered before reaching 
Secure without revealing Hidden information. The 
transfer cost is not the primary concern 
considering the communication throughput. 
However, these data must be filtered out very 
quickly to avoid congesting the Secure processing.  
• Prefer reads to writes based on the Flash write/read 
cost ratio. In Flash, writes are roughly between 3 
to 12 times slower than reads depending on the 
portion of the page to be read (full page vs. single 
word). Despite this discrepancy, writes on Flash 
are significantly more efficient than on disk (about 
200µs per 2KB page). 
3. COMPUTING SELECTIONS AND JOINS  
This section focuses on Select-Project-Join queries 
involving exact match and/or range selections 
followed by equi-joins between key and foreign key 
attributes over a traditional database schema, 
organized as a tree (see Figure 3)3. We use the term 
Root table to refer to the largest central table of a 
database and Node table to refer to all non-root tables 
                                                                 
3 Considering nested queries, non-equijoins or non-tree structured 
database schemas is left for future works. 
connected to the root table through direct or transitive 
joins on keys. The Root table is denoted by T0 and 
Node tables are denoted by Ti with i≠0, where the 
subscript represents the position of the table in the 
schema, as pictured in Figure 3. The notation vu (resp. 
hu) denotes the uth Visible (resp. Hidden) attribute of a 
table. Finally, id refers to the surrogate attribute of a 
table4 and fki refers to a foreign key referencing table 
Ti. Using this notation, the queries of interest can be 
expressed as: 
General form:  
 SELECT  {Ti.id} 
 FROM  {Ti} 
 WHERE  {Ti.fkj= Tj.id} and 
{Ti.vu θ valuem} and 
{Ti.hv θ valuen}  
 
Example: 
 SELECT D.id, P.id, M.id 
 FROM  Measurements M, Doctors D, Patients P 
 WHERE  M.pid = P.id // foreign keys are Hidden 
                    and P.did = D.id  
  and D.specialty=’Psychiatrist’ // Visible 
  and P.bodymassindex > 25 // Hidden 
Figure 3: Database schema and generic 
 select-join-project-on-key queries. 
For the sake of exposition, we consider projections on 
IDs only and delay the discussion concerning 
projections on non-key attributes to Section 4.  
3.1 The case for a fully indexed model 
While selections can always be executed in linear 
time in the size of a table, join performance is highly 
sensitive to the respective size of its operands. The 
TPC-C and TPC-H benchmarks give examples of 
database schemas and representative cardinalities. 
Order-line in TPC-C and LineItem in TPC-H of 
respective cardinalities SF×300K and SF×6M tuples 
(with SF a scale factor) are joined with tables roughly 
ten times smaller. Hence, the problem addressed in 
GhostDB is computing selections and joins over node 
tables (hundreds of thousand of tuples) and an 
arbitrarily large root table (millions of tuples) with a 
very small quantity of RAM (typically 64KB).  
Join algorithms can be split in two classes depending 
on whether they exploit a pre-computed access 
                                                                 
4 By convention, T.id refers to the surrogate attribute of a table T, 
idT refers to the instances of this attribute and ID or IDs refers 
to the term tuple identifier(s). 
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structure (e.g., join index, bitmap index) or not. The 
main representatives of the latter class, also named 
“last resort” algorithms [5], are nested block join, 
sort-merge join, simple hash join, Grace hash join, 
hybrid hash join. An extensive performance 
evaluation of these algorithms can be found in [10]. 
This study bears particular relevance to our context 
since it considers RAM sizes common a decade ago 
(i.e., several megabytes). That work shows that the 
performance of last resort algorithms quickly 
deteriorates when the smallest join argument exceeds 
the size of RAM. Except for the nested block join 
(which requires many passes on at least one table and 
has a quadratic time complexity), all algorithms 
produce intermediate results, an unfavorable situation 
in Flash where writes are far more costly than reads. 
Join indices [26] alleviate the problem. However, 
consecutive joins (e.g, σ(T1) ►◄  T2  ►◄  T3) either 
incur random accesses in the join index JIT2T3 or a sort 
of the σ(T1) ►◄  T2 result on the IDs of T2, a costly 
operation when little RAM is available and writes are 
expensive. Accessing the result tuples of the right 
operand table incurs random accesses or a sort. Jive 
join and Slam join have been proposed to optimize 
joins through join indices [15]. Both algorithms make 
a single sequential pass through each input table, in 
addition to one pass through the join index and two 
passes through a temporary file, whose size is half 
that of the join index. Both algorithms require that the 
number of RAM pages is of the order of the square 
root of the number of pages of the smaller table. In the 
case of a RAM size of 32×2K pages, this would imply 
that the smallest table could not exceed two 
megabytes. The size constraint thus disqualifies these 
algorithms for us. 
More radical solutions have been devised for the Data 
Warehouse (DW) context. To deal with Star queries 
involving very large Fact tables (hundreds of GB), 
DW systems usually index the Fact table (i.e., root 
table for us) on all its foreign keys to precompute the 
joins with all Dimension tables (i.e., node table for 
us); in addition, all Dimension attributes participating 
in queries are indexed [14], [18], [28]. This massive 
indexation scheme is well adapted to the DW context 
where the performance of complex queries is the main 
issue and the update cost is not a concern. 
Query performance is also a central issue in GhostDB 
and the tiny RAM at our disposal dictates a fully 
indexed model with the requirement to support a 
combination of selections and joins on both Visible 
and Hidden attributes. We present a new indexing 
data structure first and then we show how to use it to 
combine Untrusted and Secure computations. 
3.2 Subtree Key Table and Climbing Index 
The primary requirement of the GhostDB indexing 
model is to precompute all select and join operations 
in a way which minimizes RAM usage. This leads to 
the definition of a new index structure pictured in 
Figure 4 for the database schema of Figure 3.  
Multidimensional join indexes, as suggested in the 
DW context for Star schemas [18], are less RAM 
demanding than binary join indices [26] since 
combinations of joins are precomputed. To support 
any form of foreign key-based join expression, we 
introduce a data structure called the Subtree Key 
Table (SKT). For the root table, each tuple of SKTT0 
concatenates the IDs of tuples from all descendant 
tables, thus precomputing the join with all of them. 
Similarly SKTT1 is a multidimensional join index for 
tables T1, T11 and T12.  
Selection indexes could be implemented as traditional 
B+-Trees. However, the processing of an expression 
of the form σhjθvalueTi ►◄  T0 would incur: (1) a lookup 
in Ti.hj index to get the IDs of Ti tuples satisfying the 
selection qualification then (2) for each of these IDs, a 
lookup in the T0.fki index to get the IDs of T0 tuples 
satisfying the join expression. The final result is the 
union of all lists of IDs from T0 obtained in step (2). 
Depending on the selectivity of the selection, the 
number of lists participating in the union may be 
large, requiring multiple passes and intermediate 
writes in a system with little RAM. An alternative 
solution may be to use bitmaps in place of lists of IDs 
[18], [28]. This solution decreases the cost of union 
but applies only to attributes on low cardinality 
domains, so lacks generality. Instead, we propose an 
index that we call a climbing index. A climbing index 
defined on an attribute contains, for each entry, one 
sublist of IDs per ancestor table up to the root. For 
example, each entry of any index on T12 contains a 
sublist of IDs for the table T12 itself, a sublist for the 
ID of T1 and a sublist for the ID of T0. Hence, the cost 
of cascading index lookups (index traversal and union 
of ID lists) is avoided. For the special case of root 
table attributes, climbing indexes and traditional B+-
Trees are identical.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 : Subtree Key 
Table and Climbing Index. 
Combined together, SKTs and climbing indexes allow 
selecting tuples in any table, reaching any non-leaf 
node table (including the root table) in a single step 
and projecting attributes from any other table. This 
benefit in terms of performance and RAM usage 
comes at an extra cost in terms of stable storage. 
However, this extra cost is less than it may appear. 
First, the SKT columns corresponding to foreign keys 
come for free since they do not need to be stored in 
the associated table. For instance, SKTT1 is nothing 
but the projection of T1 on all its foreign keys 
attributes (referencing T11 and T12). Only the foreign 
keys of descendant tables other than child tables incur 
an extra storage cost. Second, assuming a consistent 
database with respect to referential constraints, SKTT 
has the same cardinality as the associated table T, so 
that keeping the SKTT sorted on the table identifiers 
of T eliminates the need to store those identifiers (e.g., 
the IDs of T1, pictured in grey in the figure, are not 
stored in STKT1). Hence, the main extra storage cost is 
incurred by the multidimensional lists of IDs in the 
climbing indexes. The full set of IDs of a non-leaf 
node in the schema is replicated in the indexes of all 
its descendants. As pictured in the figure, this cost is 
dominated by the replication of the IDs of the root 
table.  
3.3 Mixing Visible and Hidden computations 
Because Untrusted is fast, we want Untrusted to do as 
much work as possible. Under the assumption that 
foreign keys are Hidden5, Untrusted is granted 
permission to: (1) compute Visible predicates of a 
query Q (i.e., select expressed on Visible attributes), 
(2) project the result of this computation on any 
Visible column, and (3) send the result to Secure. 
There is no leak of Hidden data simply because no 
information leaves Secure.  
A naïve strategy that prevents information leak would 
be to ask Secure to perform all the selections and joins 
on Hidden attributes and to perform a final join with 
the result of the Visible selections performed by 
Untrusted. One drawback to this strategy is that it 
pushes the Visible selections after Hidden joins even 
if they are selective. A second drawback is that the 
strategy requires doing the final join with a last resort 
algorithm. The climbing property of the climbing 
indexes along with the SKT provides a set of 
opportunities to build a much better Query Execution 
Plan (QEP): pushing selections before joins and 
performing all joins by index. 
If, however, the selectivity of a Visible selection is 
rather low, traversing the indexes may be a poor 
choice. An alternative is pushing such selections after 
the Hidden joins by a filtering mechanism. This 
alternative is effective if this filtering can be done in a 
single pass over the result of the Hidden joins. To 
meet this requirement, we use Bloom filters. The 
Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data 
structure that is used to test whether an element is a 
member of a set [3]. A bit vector is built in RAM and 
independent hash functions are applied to each 
element of the set. The false positive rate can be kept 
very low (e.g., less than 3%) if the size of the bit 
vector is at least 8 times the cardinality of the set and 
this amount increases smoothly while the size of the 
bit vector decreases. This property makes Bloom 
filters well suited to RAM-constrained environments 
as discussed in more detail in section 3.4. When a 
Bloom filter is used to filter out tuples produced by 
Hidden joins, false positives must be discarded at 
projection time by an exact selection. 
                                                                 
5 This assumption could be relaxed to allow Untrusted to perform 
joins on Visible attributes, thus making the computation easier and 
more efficient. We concentrate in this paper on the most difficult 
situation.  
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Query Execution Primitives 
To help explain the variety of QEPs which can be 
produced by combining climbing indexes, subtree key 
tables, and Bloom filters, we introduce the following 
operators:  
Vis(Q, T, π) → {<idT, vi_value, vj_value …>}↓: 
Secure gets from Untrusted the list of IDs of Table T 
corresponding to tuples satisfying all Visible 
predicates of query Q along with attribute values for 
the attributes in π. Superscript ↓ indicates that the list 
returned is sorted on the first attribute (idT). 
CI(I, P, π) → {{idT}↓}: looks up in the climbing index 
I and, for each entry satisfying predicate P, delivers 
the list of IDs referencing the table selected by π. 
Predicate P is of the form (attribute θ value) or 
(attribute ∈{value}).  
Merge(∩ i{∪ j{idT}↓}) → {idT}↓: performs the unions 
and intersections of a collection of sorted lists of IDs 
of the same table T translating a logical expression 
over T expressed in conjunctive normal form. 
SJoin({idT}, SKTT, π) → {< idT, idTi, idTj … >}↓: 
performs a key semi-join between a list of IDs of a 
table T and SKTT table and projects the result on the 
subset of SKTT attributes selected by π. The result is 
sorted on idT. 
BuildBF({idT}) → BF: builds a Bloom filter from a 
list of IDs. 
ProbeBF(BF, {< idT, idTi, idTj … >}) → {< idT, idTi, 
idTj … >}: filters tuples from an input set using a 
Bloom filter.  
Let us first consider a simple query involving a 
selection on one Visible and one Hidden attribute of 
the same node table, as well as a join with the root 
table.  
Q:  SELECT T0.id 
     FROM   T0, T1 
 WHERE T0.fk1=T1.id and                       
T1.v1θvalue1 and                                        
T1.h1θvalue2 
Let us denote by QEPSJ the part of a QEP dedicated to 
the execution of selections and joins. The simplest 
QEPSJ for query Q would be:  
1. use the index on T1.h1 in order to get sorted lists of 
idT0 resulting from σh1θvalue2(T1),  
2. get from Untrusted the list of idT1 result of 
σv1θvalue1(T1),  
3. for each of these idT1, do a lookup on the T1.id 
index to get a sorted list of idT0 and  
4. compute the intersection between, (1) the union of 
the idT0 lists from step 1, and (2) the union of the 
idT0 lists from step 3.  
This plan executing selections first, it is called Pre-
Filter QEPSJ. 
Pre-Filter QEPSJ:  
CI(T1.h1, θ value2, T0.id) → {Li} 
CI(T1.id, ∈ Vis(Q, T1, T1.id), T0.id) → {Lj} 
 Merge((∪iLi) ∩ (∪jLj)) → result 
Pre-Filtering suffers from the same drawbacks as 
cascading indexes. First, it incurs as many lookups on 
the T1.id index as there are tuples resulting from the 
Visible selection. Second, these repetitive lookups 
may produce a large number of ID lists which need to 
be merged, a multi-pass/write-intensive process on a 
tiny RAM. As mentioned earlier, if the selectivity of 
the Visible selection is low, a post-filtering approach 
that pushes Visible selections after joins may 
outperform pre-filtering. Post-Filtering works as 
follows: 
Post-Filter QEPSJ: 
 BuildBF(Vis(Q, T1, T1.id))) → BF 
CI(T1.h1, θ value2, T0.id) → {Li} 
 SJoin(Merge(∪iLi), SKTT0, <T0.id, T1.id>) → F’ 
 ProbeBF(BF, F’) → result superset 
As mentioned in Section 2.3, Visible data received by 
Secure may include a potentially large portion of 
irrelevant data which cannot be filtered without 
revealing Hidden information. An important 
optimization of both Pre-Filtering and Post-Filtering 
is thus obtained by filtering Visible as early as 
possible, intersecting Visible data with the result of 
Hidden selections, possibly using the climbing index. 
Reducing Visible data cardinality benefits Pre-Filter 
plans by decreasing the number of accesses to the 
climbing index, simplifying also the subsequent 
Merge phase. For Post-Filter plans, it reduces the 
Bloom filter size resulting in less RAM consumption 
and/or better filtering efficiency. We call the resulting 
strategies Cross-filtering. Note that the redundant 
lookup in T1.h1 which appears in Cross-Post-filter 
QEPSJ can be easily avoided in practice. 
Cross-Pre-filter QEPSJ:  
CI(T1.h1, θ value2, T1.id) → {Li} 
Merge((∪iLi)∩Vis(Q,T1,T1.id))→L 
CI(T1.id, ∈ L, T0.id) → {Lj} 
Merge(∪jLj) → result 
Cross-Post-filter QEPSJ:  
CI(T1.h1, θ value2, T1.id) → {Li} 
 BuildBF(Merge((∪iLi)∩Vis(Q,T1,T1.id)))→BF 
CI (T1.h1, θ value2, T0.id) → {Lj} 
 SJoin(Merge(∪jLj), SKTT0, <T0.id, T1.id>) → F’ 
 ProbeBF(BF, F’) → result superset 
Let us now consider more complex queries where 
selections apply on Visible and Hidden attributes of 
different tables, followed by joins, based on hidden 
foreign keys. 
Q:  SELECT T0.id  
 FROM  T0, T1, T12 
 WHERE T0.fk1 = T1.id and T1.fk12=T12.id and 
     T1.v1θvalue1 and    
     T12.h2=value2 and T0.h3=value3 
Depending on the selectivities, a pre-filtering or post-
filtering approach can be selected per predicate. In 
addition, the Cross-(Pre or Post) filtering optimization 
can be exploited to combine the selectivity of 
selections on intermediate tables of the join tree (e.g., 
T1) with the selectivity of selections on Hidden 
attributes of descendant tables (e.g., T12). This 
optimization is made possible thanks to the climbing 
indexes which associate to each entry, one sublist of 
IDs per ancestor table in the join tree. Selections on 
the root table constitute a special and favorable case 
combining the selectivities of selections applied to all 
nodes of the join tree and delivering results sorted on 
idT0 (the ideal case for the Merge operator). We show 
below a candidate QEPSJ where pre-filtering is 
selected for (T12.h2=value2) and cross-post-filtering is 
selected for (T1.v1θvalue1): 
Mixed QEPSJ:  
BuildBF(Merge(CI(T12.h2,=value2,T1.id) ∩     
Vis(Q,T1,T1.id)))→BF 
Merge(CI(T12.h2,=value2,T0.id) ∩  
CI(T0.h3,=value3,T0.id)) → L 
 SJoin(L, SKTT0, < T0.id, T1.id >) → F’ 
 ProbeBF(BF, F’) → result superset 
3.4 RAM efficient implementation of basic 
operators 
Recall that a central requirement is to evaluate the 
QEP introduced above with a very small RAM (as 
mentioned, a typical value is 64KB, that is 32 buffers 
of 2KB, the I/O unit with the Flash module). Here we 
discuss the performance of the operators in terms of 
I/O, neglecting the CPU cost. Each operator has 
different requirements in terms of RAM. Regarding 
Vis, a specific buffer is dedicated to the 
communication channel in the smart USB key so that 
the download from Untrusted to Secure can be 
processed with no RAM consumption. All indexes in 
CI are implemented by means of B+-Trees, so that CI 
requires at most one buffer per B+-Tree level. SJoin 
implements a key semi-join between a list of IDs and 
a SKT sorted on the same criteria. SJoin requires only 
two buffers to sequentially scan the operands and one 
buffer to write the result.  
Bloom filters consume significant RAM. The 
accuracy of a Bloom filter depends on the ratio m/n 
where m is the size of the bit vector and n is the 
cardinality of the set. m=8n is considered a good 
tradeoff between accuracy and space usage (false 
positive rate = 0.024 with 4 hash functions) [3]. 
Hence, a Bloom filter built over a list of IDs is four 
times smaller than the initial list, making it a good 
candidate to participate in RAM bounded QEP6. 
When the lists of IDs are not too large, the RAM can 
accommodate several Bloom filters, which can then 
execute in parallel on the same operand, a significant 
optimization. When the cardinality of the ID list is 
larger than the RAM size in bytes (e.g., more than 
64.000 elements), we decrease the ratio m/n 
accordingly, entailing a smooth degradation of the 
Bloom filter accuracy (e.g., false positive rate 
becomes 0.055 for m=6n).  
The Merge operator is the most complex to implement 
in a bounded RAM. Merge must compute expressions 
of the form (L1 ∩ L2 …∩ Lk) where each Li is a list of 
IDs answering a selection predicate on a single 
column. The number of selection predicates in a query 
is usually low, and so is the number of Li. However, 
an equality predicate on a Visible attribute of a node 
                                                                 
6 Compressed Bloom filters have been proposed but the net effect 
of this technique is to reduce the rate of false positives with the 
same space occupancy rather than decreasing the bit vector size 
[17]. This technique does not apply to our context because 
RAM is required to decompress the Bloom filter. 
table generates a list of IDs of that table; when these 
are sent to Secure, the CI operator takes this list as 
input and delivers, for each element of the list, one 
sublist of IDs of an ancestor table in the schema (e.g., 
CI (T1.id, ∈ Vis(Q, T1, T1.id), idT0) → {Li}). The 
evaluation of range predicates on Hidden attributes 
also delivers a set of sublists of IDs. Hence, Li lists 
corresponding to range predicates on Hidden 
attributes or to predicates on Visible attributes are of 
the form (Li1 ∪ Li2 …∪ Lij) and the number of sublists 
Lij can be arbitrarily high. Because each (sub)list is 
sorted on the same criteria, the computation of the 
complete expression of unions and intersections can 
be performed optimally by a sequential scan of each 
(sub)list Lij provided the RAM is large enough to 
accommodate one buffer per sublist plus one buffer 
for writing the output. If this condition does not hold, 
one can consider two fundamental alternatives 
(smarter algorithms can be devised): 
1. Perform, before the Merge, a union of sublists of 
IDs to reduce their total number to less than or 
equal to the number of RAM buffers. This can be 
done by loading in RAM the largest number of 
sublists Lij of the same list Li, sorting them to 
form a single sublist and writing that list back in 
Flash. The cost of this reduction phase being 
linear with the size of the sublists, the smallest 
sublists of each list are the best candidates for 
reduction. 
2. Implement a Merge algorithm that requires fewer 
buffers than the number of (sub)lists to be 
merged. A rough example of such algorithm is 
splitting each buffer into subbuffers so that one 
subbuffer can be allocated to the scan of each 
sublist. The size of a subbuffer being smaller than 
a I/O unit, this entails a higher cost for the scan.  
The optimal alternative depends on the ratio between 
the number of sublists to be merged, the number of 
RAM buffers, and on the element distribution in the 
lists. Space limitations prevent us from presenting an 
exhaustive analysis of the possibilities. Instead, we 
discuss the first alternative and its basic tradeoff: the 
number of sublists can be reduced to the number of 
RAM buffers or to fewer in order to save RAM. The 
benefit of the latter super-reduction strategy is to offer 
the opportunity to execute pipelined operators in 
RAM. For instance, if the RAM could accommodate 
the buffers required by the Merge and a (set of) 
Bloom filter(s), the operators of the sequence Merge-
SJoin-ProbeBF could be pipelined without entailing 
the materialization in Flash of any intermediate result, 
yielding a high performance benefit. This observation 
about pipelining in RAM further motivates the use of 
climbing indexes to reduce the number of sublists 
resulting from the selections. 
4. COMPUTING PROJECTIONS 
Let us now consider complete queries including 
projections on both Visible and Hidden attributes. 
These attributes may or may not participate in 
selection predicates. In the example below, vlist and 
hlist denote respectively a list of Visible and Hidden 
attributes: 
Query Q:  
 SELECT T0.vlist, T0.hlist, T1.vlist, T1.hlist, T12.vlist, 
T12.hlist 
 FROM  T0, T1, T12 
WHERE T0.fk1 = T1.id and T1.fk12=T12.id and 
T1.v1θvalue1 and T12.h2θvalue2 and 
T0.h3θvalue3 
The complexity of the projection operation comes 
from distinctive features of our architecture: 
1. The set of Visible attribute values sent by 
Untrusted may contain many values that ultimately 
will not appear in the result (see Section 2.3).  
2. The projection operation must discard false 
positives generated by a Post-Filtering strategy in 
the result of QEPSJ(Q). 
3. The RAM is still a scarce resource. 
To adapt to these features, the Project algorithm:  
1. does the projection on a table-by-table basis to 
reduce RAM consumption,  
2. avoids accesses to irrelevant attribute values sent by 
Untrusted,  
3. postpones the integration of all attribute values in 
the result tuples until the end of processing, 
thereby saving RAM and then iterates over the 
result of QEPSJ(Q) and  
4. minimizes the cost of discarding false positives. 
We concentrate below on the most difficult case 
where both Visible and Hidden attributes from the 
same table are projected.  
The Project algorithm is given in Figure 5 and works 
as follows:  
Partitioning the QEPSJ(Q) result: The first step of the 
algorithm (line 1) takes as input the result of 
QEPSJ(Q) evaluating the Where statement of query Q 
and performs a SJoin to get the IDs of all tables 
involved in the Select statement7. Because the Project 
algorithm considers one table at a time, the result of 
SJoin is vertically partitioned (one column per table 
ID, denoted by QEPSJ(Q).Ti.id in the algorithm) to 
avoid repetitive reads of unnecessary columns. All 
QEPSJ(Q).Ti.id columns are stored in root table ID 
order (i.e., T0.id) and have all the same cardinality.  
Approximate filtering of irrelevant values sent by 
Untrusted: For each node table Ti, i≠0, having at least a 
Visible attribute to be projected, a Bloom filter is built 
over QEPSJ(Q).Ti.id (line 3) and used (line 4) to filter 
out the irrelevant idTi sent by Untrusted at selection 
time (i.e., corresponding to tuples satisfying the 
Visible selection but disqualified by other predicates 
of the query). This step produces σVHTi.id, the set of 
Ti IDs corresponding to tuples satisfying all Visible 
and Hidden predicates of the Where statement. Just as 
Bloom filters used in QEPSJ introduce false positives 
for Visible selections, Bloom filters used in Project 
introduce false positives with respect to the QEPSJ 
result.  
Building tuples on a table basis: According to the 
Select statement, Visible attribute values (sent by 
Untrusted) and/or Hidden attribute values (taken 
directly in TiH, the Hidden image of Ti) are combined 
by the MJoin operator (line 6) into complete tuples 
<pos, Ti.vlist, Ti.hlist> where pos is the position of 
this tuple with respect to QEPSJ(Q).Ti.id column. The 
MJoin (MJoin stands for Merge, Multi-pass, Multi-
join) operator works as follows. Ti.vlist, Ti.hlist and 
σVHTi.id are all sorted on idTi and can be joined by a 
sequential scan of each list and a simple merge. The 
result of this merge is stored in RAM up to the RAM 
capacity (minus two buffers). The two buffers are 
used to do a complete scan over QEPSJ(Q).Ti.id and to 
join it on Ti IDs with the elements present in RAM 
and write the result back in Flash. If required, this 
process is repeated ║σVHTi.id║size(<Ti.id, Ti.vlist, 
Ti.hlist>)/(RAM – 4KB) times. The factor ║σVHTi.id║ 
exemplifies the benefit of filtering irrelevant values 
sent by Untrusted. MJoin automatically eliminates all 
false positives on this table, except those introduced 
by a join with false positive tuples from other tables. 
Combining tuples from all tables: The last operation 
(line 7) joins all the resulting lists of tuples from all 
                                                                 
7 If QEPSJ follows a Post-Filtering strategy this step is skipped 
because a SJoin has already been performed with the Root table 
to get all necessary IDs. 
node tables together and potentially with Visible and 
Hidden attributes of the root table. All the operands 
being naturally sorted on idT0 (or equivalently on 
position), this operation is done by a sequential scan 
of each operand and a simple merge. This join 
automatically eliminates the false positives not 
discarded by MJoin. 
 (1)SJoin(QEPSJ(Q),SKTT0, 
     <Ti.id/∃Ti.attribute∈Q.ProjectList >) 
(2) For each Ti, i≠0 / ∃Ti.vj∈Q. ProjectList 
(3) BuildBF(QEPSJ(Q).Ti.id) → BF 
(4) ProbeBF(BF, Vis(Q, Ti, Ti.id)) → σVHTi.id 
(5) For each Ti, i≠0/ ∃Ti. attribute ∈Q. ProjectList 
(6) MJoin([Vis(Q, Ti , < Ti.id, Ti.vlist >), σVHTi.id],
   <Ti.id, [TiH.hlist]>, QEPSJ(Q).Ti.id) 
     →{<pos,Ti.vlist,Ti.hlist>}↓ 
(7) Join({{<pos, Ti.vlist, Ti.hlist>}↓}, [Vis(Q, T0 ,  
  < T0.id, T0.vlist >], < T0.id, [T0H.hlist]>)          
→ Final result 
Figure 5: Project algorithm (QEPP) 
5. COMPUTING AGGREGATES 
The most natural way to compute aggregates is to 
perform the aggregation after the projection. While 
this simple solution, called hereafter Post-
Aggregation, works for all kinds of aggregative 
queries (mono or multi-table queries, aggregation on 
one or several attributes, etc.), considering projections 
and aggregations jointly may allow for several 
optimizations. In the following, we first describe this 
simple solution then we introduce possible 
optimizations on a sample query, representative of 
common aggregative queries.  
5.1 Project then aggregate 
The main problem of the Post-Aggregation strategy is 
that there is little RAM available to compute the 
aggregation. However, two remarks merit attention: 
(i) the last step of the projection algorithm (join 
operation) consumes a small portion of the available 
RAM since all inputs are sorted on idT0 or 
equivalently on position (see Section 4); (ii) the 
aggregation can be done in pipeline if, for each group 
appearing in the projection result, we can keep in the 
remaining RAM the grouping attribute(s) and one 
temporary value for each computed aggregate (except 
for avg which incurs the computation of sum and 
count). In this optimistic case, the aggregation cost is 
negligible since it does not incur any additional read 
or write operation in Flash memory. The algorithm is 
trivial: for each incoming tuple: project the grouping 
attribute(s), if the associated group is already in 
RAM, update the aggregate value(s), and otherwise 
initialize a new group in RAM. 
When the computation cannot be done in one 
pipelined step, different strategies can be devised. The 
simplest strategy consists in storing in a Flash buffer 
OF1, tuples that cannot be considered in the first 
iteration (i.e., associated to groups which did not fit in 
RAM). The RAM is then freed and tuples from OF1 
are processed in a second iteration using the entire 
RAM (except two buffers for input and output), 
potentially overflowing in OF2, then OF3..OFn for the 
next iterations.  
Different optimizations exist for the management of 
these next iterations. At iteration i, the options are: 
(1) continue writing overflow tuples in OFi, where 
size(OFi) < size(OFi-1); (2) write a bit vector BVi 
indicating which tuples of OF1 remain to be processed 
after iteration i; (3) keep in RAM the smallest 
grouping values strictly greater than the last grouping 
value processed at iteration i-1; this means treating the 
grouping values in a predefined order, skipping those 
which do not belong to the range of interest for the 
current iteration, in the spirit of [2]. 
An alternative to write overflow tuples could be to 
read them again from the aggregate input flow but this 
would incur a potentially large number of reads for 
recomputing the projection's join (see Section 4). 
5.2 Aggregate then project 
We introduce below optimizations that may apply to a 
large number of aggregate queries. We illustrate them 
on the following query pattern:  
Query Q:  
SELECT  Ti.att1, SUM(T0.att2)    
FROM  T0, T1, ….,  Ti 
WHERE  T0.fk1=T1.id and T1.fk2=T2.id and … 
and T0.att3θvalue1 and T1.att4θvalue2     
and … 
GROUP BY Ti.att1 
The goal is to apply the aggregation before the 
projection, thereby leading to strategies called Pre-
Aggregation. Basically, the idea is: for each distinct 
value of the grouping attribute (Ti.att1): to retrieve the 
list of IDs ({Ti.id}) referencing tuples sharing this 
value, to store it (potentially partially) in RAM, and to 
join it with the result of QEPSJ(Q) using Ti.id. This list 
can be either obtained from Untrusted (when att1 is 
visible) or read from the Climbing index on Ti.att1 
(when att1 is hidden). For the sample query Q, this 
means joining {<Ti.att1, {Ti.id}>↓} with 
{<T0.id, Ti.id>↓}. The values of T0.att2 to be 
aggregated are obtained as in the projection algorithm 
(by accessing sequentially T0 hidden or visible 
attribute). While the idea of this algorithm is 
attractive, several problems must be solved.  
First, {<Ti.att1, {Ti.id}>↓} may contain many useless 
Ti.id values (and even complete groups) since not all 
query predicates can be considered together. Building 
a Bloom filter with the values of Ti.id present in the 
result of QEPSJ(Q) may offer an efficient way to 
discard useless values. The result of this filter is 
stored in Flash since RAM is already filled by the 
Bloom filter.  
Second, the RAM may not accommodate the whole 
structure {<Ti.att1, {Ti.id}, aggregated values>↓}. A 
simple optimization is to replace Ti.att1 by an 
identifier referencing the corresponding value in the 
result of the preceding phase of filtering over 
{<Ti.att1, {Ti.id}>↓}. If it still does not fit in RAM 
several iterations will be necessary. In the first 
iteration, the RAM is loaded with as many entries as 
possible from {<Ti.att1, {Ti.id}, aggregated 
values>↓}. Then, for each tuple from QEPSJ(Q), we 
first retrieve the T0.att2 values to be aggregated. Since 
the result of QEPSJ(Q) is sorted on T0.id, this can be 
done using only two buffers in RAM. If the associated 
Ti.id is found in RAM, then the value is aggregated. 
Otherwise, the result tuple is written in an overflow 
buffer on Flash (OF1). When all the results of 
QEPSJ(Q) have been processed (either aggregated or 
sent to the overflow buffer), a first part of the final 
result has been computed and can be delivered after 
an efficient merge with the Ti.att1 stored in Flash (both 
are in the same order). This process iterates until all 
groups are processed.  
Third, false positives may be present, either produced 
during the filtering step of {<Ti.att1, {Ti.id}>↓} 
described above or by a post-filtering Select-Join 
plan. In the former case, false positives are 
automatically removed during the join operation (the 
filtering step is indeed optional). In the latter case 
however, post-filtering must be precluded (or replaced 
by an exact post filtering) for any selection on a 
visible attribute of a table for which there is no 
projection of a visible attribute. For instance, a post-
selection on Ti.vj using a Bloom filter, followed by an 
aggregation on a hidden attribute Ti.h1, may lead to 
erroneous results.  
While this algorithm seems intuitively more costly 
than the one presented in Section 5.1, it replaces the 
projection step and may thus lead to better global 
execution time. It is however restricted to certain 
query patterns. The study of all possible optimizations 
is out of the scope of this paper and will be the subject 
of future work. 
6. GLOBAL QUERY EXECUTION PLAN 
Figure 6 presents the global QEP for an abstract query 
involving selections, joins, projections and 
aggregation over Visible and Hidden attributes. 
Circles represent operators and edges show the 
composition of operators with annotations indicating 
the content and ordering of their input and output 
operands. Superimposed boxes mean that similar 
subtrees can be repeated in the QEP if several 
predicates (on different attributes) appear in the 
query. The gray area on the left symbolizes Untrusted. 
For clarity, the figure shows a single table in 
Untrusted participating in selections on Visible 
attributes following either a pre-filtering strategy 
(bottom of the QEP) or a post-filtering strategy 
(middle of the QEP). The subtrees drawn in dashed 
lines illustrate a potential cross-filtering optimization 
for both strategies. The upper part of the figure 
highlights the particular management of projection 
over Visible and Hidden attributes of the root table.  
Materialization steps are not represented because they 
depend on the ratio between the size of the 
intermediate results and the RAM allocated to the 
execution of each operator instance. The main 
tradeoff in the RAM allocation decision is between 
the Merge and the Build-Probe operators in the QEPSJ 
part of the plan, as discussed in Section 3.4. Other 
operators in QEPSJ consume only a couple of RAM 
buffers. In QEPP, the RAM allocation decision is 
simpler. Unlike Build-Probe in QEPSJ where the size 
of the Bloom filter can be calibrated according to the 
size of its Visible operand (a set of Ti.id), Build-Probe 
in QEPP builds a Bloom filter over QEPSJ(Q).Ti.id, a 
list of IDs containing a variable number of duplicates 
(this number is linked to the distance between Ti and 
the root table in the schema). Due to the difficulty of 
estimating the number of duplicates, and since the 
project algorithm works on a table-by-table basis, the 
Bloom filter is calibrated by default to occupy the 
entire RAM. This is a poor choice if a better 
calibration would allow a pipelining of Build-Probe 
and MJoin, an improbable situation for the queries we 
are interested in. 
  
Figure 6: Abstract Query Execution Plan for 
general select-project-join (and group by) queries 
on visible and hidden attributes. 
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7. EXPERIMENTS 
This section presents experimental results obtained 
from both synthetic and real data sets. We first 
describe the experimental platform and the data sets. 
The next subsections study respectively the storage 
overhead incurred by the proposed index, the cost of 
selections and joins, the cost of projections, the cost 
of aggregations, the impact of communication 
throughput and finally the cost of complete QEPs. 
7.1 Experimental platform 
Our industrial partner Gemalto has announced the 
availability of the first commercial smart USB keys 
by less than one year. These devices will have 
hardware characteristics close to the one presented in 
section 2.2, with 64KB of RAM and 256MB of 
external Flash (with a rapid growth of the Flash 
capacity forecast). Gemalto provided us with a 
software simulator for this device. Our prototype has 
been developed in C on top of this simulator. This 
simulator is not cycle-accurate so that performance 
measures in absolute time are not significant. 
However, this simulator is I/O accurate, meaning that 
it delivers the exact number of pages read and written 
in Flash. 
This includes the I/O performed by the Flash 
Translation Layer which manages wear levering, 
garbage collection and translation of logical addresses 
to physical (updates are not performed in place in 
Flash). The simulator delivers also the exact number 
of bytes transferred between the RAM and the Flash 
Data Register. The time to read (resp. write) k bytes in 
Flash and load them in RAM is composed of the time 
to load the page from the Flash to the Data Register in 
the Flash module (25µs) and the time to transfer the k 
bytes from the Data Register to the RAM (k×50ns). 
This means that reading a page costs between 25µs 
and 125µs depending on the portion actually loaded in 
RAM. Therefore, the ratio between a read and a page 
write in Flash roughly vary from 2.5 to 12. Other 
parameters are presented in Table 1. The performance 
of operators is measured in terms of milliseconds, and 
in based on the cost of communication and I/O.  
7.2 Data sets 
The real dataset contains sanitized medical data 
related to diabetes. From this database schema, we 
select as hidden attribute all the foreign keys as well 
as attributes that could identify an individual (patients 
or doctors). The database schema is described below. 
A superscript indicates the Hidden/Visible status of 
the attribute; the size in bytes is indicated in brackets. 
As usual, primary keys are underlined while foreign 
keys are in italics.  
 
Doctors [4.5 Ktuples]: (idVH(4), specialtyV(20), 
descriptionV(60), first-nameH(20), 
nameH(20)). 
 
Patients [14 Ktuples]: (idVH(4), doctor_idH(4), first-
nameV(20), nameH(20),SSNH(10), 
addressH(50), birthdateH(10), 
bodymassindexH(4), ageV(2), sexeV(2), 
cityV(20), zipcodeV(6)). 
 
Measurements [1.3 Mtuples]: (idVH(4), patient-idH(4), 
Drug-idH(4), timeV(10), measurementV(10), 
commentV(100)). 
 
Drugs[45tuples]: (idVH(4), propertyV(60), 
commentH(100)). 
 
In addition, we have built a synthetic data set to 
perform a comprehensive performance analysis, 
varying selectivities of selections on Visible and 
Hidden attributes (let us call them Visible and Hidden 
selections for simplicity). The schema of the synthetic 
data set is based on the schema introduced in Figure 
3. In this synthetic data set, data follows a uniform 
distribution. Beside keys, each table has by default 5 
Visible and 5 Hidden attributes each one of size 10 
bytes.  
T0[10 Mtuples]: (id, fk1, fk2, v1V, v2V, …, h1H, h2H, …) 
T1[1 Mtuples]: (id, fk11, fk12, v1V, v2V, …, h1H, h2H, …) 
T2[1 Mtuples]: (id, v1V, v2V, …, h1H, h2H, …)  
T11[100 Ktuples]: (id, v1V, v2V, …, h1H, h2H, …)  
T12[100 Ktuples]:  (id, v1V, v2V, …, h1H, h2H, …)  
Table 1: Main performance parameters of USB 
keys. 
Parameters Values 
Communication throughput (MB/s) Varying
Size of an ID (bytes) 4
Size of a page in Flash (bytes) 2048
RAM size (bytes) 65536
Time to read a page in Flash (µs) 25
Time to write a page in Flash (µs) 200
Time to transfer a byte between Data Register and RAM (ns) 50
7.3 Size of the index structures 
Figure 7 shows the storage cost of the SKT plus CI 
indexes and compares it to possible variants. The x-
axis is the number of indexed Hidden attributes per 
table (in addition to primary and foreign keys), 
assuming for simplicity that all tables have the same 
number of indexed attributes. DBSize is constant and 
represents the total size of all Visible and Hidden raw 
data populating the database without indexes. The 
other curves represent the storage overhead incurred 
by the index on Hidden data. FullIndex is the index 
structure presented in this paper where each non-leaf 
node of the database schema holds a SKT and each 
attribute is indexed by a climbing index referencing 
all ancestor tables. BasicIndex reduces the size of this 
index structure by considering only a single SKT (for 
the root table) as well as climbing indexes referencing 
the root table directly. The small difference between 
these two curves demonstrates that the extra price to 
pay to benefit from a complete indexation structure is 
low, the storage cost being dominated by SKTT0 and 
the lists of idT0 in all climbing indexes. The advantage 
of FullIndex over BasicIndex is to allow for a Cross 
(Pre or Post) filtering optimization and the speeding 
up of all queries whether or not they involve the Root 
table. StarIndex is in turn a reduction of the 
BasicIndex where selection indexes are traditional 
(i.e., contain lists of ID of the indexed table only) but 
include the SKT of the Root table to precompute Star 
joins. StarIndex allows query execution strategies 
similar to [18]. The large difference between 
BasicIndex and StarIndex shows that climbing 
indexes incur a significant overhead. The next section 
will show, however, that these indexes yield a high 
performance improvement for executing selections and 
joins. Finally, JoinIndex is a reduction of StarIndex 
where the SKT of the Root table is dropped. 
Traditional indexes apply on all attributes, including 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Storage cost of different indexing 
scheme. 
the keys and foreign keys, allowing the execution of 
joins in a way similar to join indices [26]. On our real 
data set, the storage cost of each indexation structure 
is: FullIndex = 57MB, BasicIndex = 56MB,  
StarIndex = 36MB, JoinIndex = 26MB and DBSize = 
169MB. 
7.4 Cost of selections and joins 
This section evaluates the respective merits of the Pre 
and Post filtering strategies, taking advantage or not 
of the Cross optimization. To this end, we measure 
Query Q, which performs a Visible selection on T1, a 
Hidden selection on T12 and joins between these two 
tables and the Root table. We vary the selectivity of 
the Visible selection (denoted by sV) and fix the 
selectivity of the Hidden selection (denoted by sH) to 
10% (sH = 0.1). In all figures, the x-axis representing 
sV is plotted with a logarithmic scale.  
Query Q:  SELECT T0.id, T1.id, T12.id, T1.v1 
   FROM    T0, T1, T12 
   WHERE T0.fk1 = T1.id and T1.fk12 = T12.id 
      and T1.v1 θ value1  
                  and T12.h2 θ value2 
Figure 8 shows the benefit of the Cross filtering 
optimization, comparing the strategies Pre-Filter with 
Cross-Pre-Filter and Post-Filter with Cross-Post-
Filter. The figure shows that the Cross filtering 
optimization is beneficial whatever the selectivity of 
the Visible selection. The benefit becomes larger as 
this selectivity decreases. For sV=0.01 (resp. sV=0.5) 
Cross-Pre-filter outperforms Pre-Filter by a factor of 
1.8 (resp. 2.3). For sV=0.5, Cross-Post-Filter also 
outperforms Post-Filter by a factor of 2. In this 
setting, the RAM can accommodate the Merge and 
the BuildBF-ProbeBF in parallel. 
 
0
5
10
15
20
0,001 0,01 0,1 1
Selectivity of Visible selection sv (log.) 
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
tim
e 
(s
)
Pre-Filter
Post-Filter
Cross-Pre-Filter
Cross-Post-Filter
 
Figure 8: Filtering vs. Cross-Filtering 
Performance. 
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Figure 9: Cross-Pre vs. Cross-Post Filtering 
Performance. 
Figure 9 compares the Cross-Pre-Filter and Cross-
Post-Filter strategies. As expected, Cross-Pre-Filter 
outperforms Cross-Post-Filter when the selectivity of 
the Visible selection is high. Cross-Pre-Filter becomes 
worse for values of sV greater than 0.1. The reason is 
that for sV>0.1 all pages of SKTT0 are accessed by 
SJoin losing the benefit of pre-filtering. However, the 
differential between Cross-Pre-Filter and Cross-Post-
Filter is never greater than 25%. This could lead to the 
conclusion that Bloom filters do not bring a 
significant benefit and, more generally, that 
postponing selections after joins (whatever their 
selectivity) is not very useful. This also shows that the 
Cross optimization is extremely effective and that 
indexes on Flash are far more robust than indexes on 
disk in low selectivity environments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Pre vs. Post-Filtering Performance. 
The Cross optimization can be exploited only in 
certain situations (more than one selection on the 
same table or Hidden selections on descendant tables 
combined with selections applied on ancestor tables). 
Figure 10 compares the Pre-Filter and Post-Filter 
strategies alone, i.e., when the Cross optimization 
does not apply. In this situation, the Bloom filters are 
much more effective. Post-Filter becomes better than 
Pre-Filter for values of sV higher than 0.05. For 
sV=0.1, Post-Filter is already 30% better than Pre-
Filter. Note that the curve Post-Filter stops at sV=0.5. 
The reason is that for lower selectivities, the Bloom 
filter introduces more false positives than it can 
eliminate in the result of QEPSJ, even if the entire 
RAM is allocated to the BuildBF-ProbeBF operators. 
In this case, Post-Filter is simply not executed and the 
selection is postponed to projection time. For 
illustrative purpose, the curve NoFilter shows the cost 
of postponing the selection to projection time 
independently of its selectivity. 
To precisely capture the benefit of Bloom filters, 
Figure 11 compares the Post-Filter and Cross-Post-
Filter strategies with Post-Select, a strategy which 
performs an exact selection on the result of QEPSJ. 
Post-Select simply loads in RAM the IDs resulting 
from the Visible selection and filters out the result of 
QEPSJ. Cross-Post-Select results from the Cross 
optimization applied to Post-Select, as usual. The 
figure justifies why we did not consider Post-Select as 
a relevant strategy in Section 3.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Post-Filtering alternatives. 
7.5 Cost of projections 
Figure 12 and 13 compare the cost of three projection 
algorithms on query Q augmented with a projection 
on Ti.h1. Project refers to the algorithm presented in 
Section 4. Project-NoBF is the Project algorithm 
without the Bloom optimization; irrelevant attribute 
values sent by Untrusted are not eliminated thereby 
incurring a higher number of iterations. Brute-Force is 
an algorithm loading the result of QEPSJ in RAM and 
accessing randomly the vlist and hlist stored in Flash. 
The figure shows that Project is 60% faster than 
Brute-Force when sV=0.1 and the gap increases with 
sV. Whereas Figure 12 considers a cross-pre-filtering 
execution, Figure 13 considers a cross-post-filtering 
execution to take into account the elimination of false 
positives introduced by the Bloom filters. Both show 
the insignificant impact of false positives and the 
effectiveness of Project algorithm. 
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Figure 12: Projecting in Cross-Pre-Filtering 
execution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Projecting in Cross-Post-Filtering 
execution. 
7.6 Cost of aggregation 
Figure 14 compares the cost of the two strategies 
denoted Post-Aggregation and Pre-Aggregation 
respectively described in Section 5.1 and 5.2 on the 
following query: 
SELECT T1.v1, SUM(T0.h1)   FROM T0, T1  
WHERE T0.fk1=T1.id and T1.v2θvalue1 and   
T1.h2θvalue2 
GROUP BY T1.v1 
The selectivity of the Visible selection (sV) is varying 
and the selectivity of the Hidden selection (sH=0.1) is 
fixed. The cardinality of attribute v1 is 1000. 
For Post-Aggregation, we consider the option where 
overflow tuples are written in Flash at the first iteration 
and a bit vector is used to optimize the next iterations. 
For Pre-Aggregation, we consider the same option for 
the first iteration but the overflow buffer is read again 
in each subsequent iteration. Figure 14 confirms that 
while Pre-Aggregation is more complex than Post-
Aggregation, the global execution time is reduced 
(around 30-40% gain). There are basically two reasons: 
(i) Pre-Aggregation avoids writing in Flash a 
substantial part of the projection result by writing only 
the distinct values of attribute T1.v1 rather than all 
instances; (ii) Pre-Aggregation projects out the T1.v1 
values and keeps only in RAM the T1 IDs and is thus 
almost insensitive to T1.v1 attribute size. 
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Figure 14: Projection and Group by cost 
Figure 15 illustrates the latter remark and shows the 
impact of the grouping attribute size (T1.v1) on the cost 
of the aggregation operation. The selectivity of the 
Visible and Hidden selections are fixed (sV = 0.1 and 
sH= 0.1). As expected, the cost of the Post-Aggregation 
increases with the size of the grouping attribute while 
the cost of Pre-Aggregation stays rather constant. 
Remark that projecting out the grouping attribute in the 
Post-aggregation is not feasible since the value of the 
grouping attribute is used to associate the tuples to the 
correct group; moreover the values of the grouping 
attribute are unordered in the projection results making 
any substitution (for instance using hash without 
collision) very expensive. 
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Figure 15: Impact of the group by attribute size  
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7.7 Communication costs 
Figure 16 shows how the communication throughput 
impacts the global performance of a query. The x-axis 
represents the throughput expressed in MBps ranging 
from 300KBps up to 10MBps. The query measured is 
the same as before, except that it projects the result on 
one (Project1), two (Project2) or three (Project3) 
Visible attributes of 10 bytes each. The query is 
executed following a Cross-Pre-Filtering approach 
considering a selectivity sV=0.01. The curves 
highlight the fact that, for this query, a 
communication throughput lesser than 1.3MBps 
becomes the main bottleneck.  
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Figure 16: Impact of the communication 
throughput. 
7.8 Query cost decomposition 
The histograms presented in Figure 17 show how the 
total execution time (excluding the communication 
time) is decomposed among the operators involved in 
the execution of the query Q. Only the most time-
consuming operators are visible in the figure, namely, 
Merge, SJoin and Project. Store represents the time to 
materialize the intermediate result produced by SJoin 
(in low selectivity queries). PRE (resp. POST) 1, 5 
and 20 denote a Cross-Pre-Filtering strategy (resp. 
Cross-Post-Filtering strategy) for a respective 
selectivity of the Visible selection of sV=0.01, 
sV=0.05 and sV=0.2. PRE is shown better than POST 
for sV=0.01, and sV=0.05 but becomes worse for 
sV=0.20. As already mentioned, for sV>0.1 all pages 
of SKTTO are accessed by SJoin losing the benefit of  
Pre-Filtering. Hence, the SJoin cost is the same in 
PRE20 and POST20 while the Merge cost is much 
higher in PRE20 than in POST20.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Cost decomposition for query Q on the 
synthetic dataset. 
Figure 18 presents the same analysis on the real data 
set. Query Q keeps the same structure, replacing table 
T0 by Measurements, table T1 by Patients and table 
T12 by Doctors. The main difference between the 
synthetic data set and the real one is the size of the 
Root table (10M tuples in T0 compared to 1.3M tuples 
in Measurements) and the ratio T0/T1 (T0/T1 = 10 
compared to Measurements/Patients ≈ 92). The first 
observation is that the execution time of the query is 
related to the size of the Root table and is roughly 
1/10 the times of the synthetic data set. The second 
observation is that the cost of the SJoin operator is 
dominant in all histograms. In fact, the relative cost of 
Project decreases because the cardinalities of the node 
tables (Patients and Doctors) are much smaller while 
the relative cost of SJoin increases due to the ratio 
Measurements/Patients≈92. 
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Figure 18: Cost decomposition for query Q on the 
real dataset. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
People talk about privacy, but give it up very easily, 
especially when faced with complex security 
procedures that offer only conditional guarantees. 
This implies that for people's sensitive data to be 
protected, the cost to protect it must require little 
physical effort and must perform well. 
This paper proposes a system called GhostDB 
whereby people carry hidden sensitive data on a smart 
USB key and they plug that key into a personal 
computer when they need to link their hidden data 
with visible public data, all with the assurance that no 
hidden data will ever go out in the open. In terms of 
the administration interface, the only change is the 
"hidden" annotation on certain fields in the create 
table command. Users issue completely standard 
SQL, so application logic is unchanged. 
GhostDB entails technical challenges having to do 
with distributed query processing on devices having 
vastly different capabilities in terms of speed, RAM 
size, and communication capability. We have 
presented a query processing framework based on the 
unconventional tradeoffs present in this unusual 
environment. The techniques show a significant 
improvement over naïve methods and make the 
solution applicable even for complex queries over 
large databases. In the course of this work, we have 
introduced techniques like climbing indexes, Subtree 
Key Tables and post-filtering by Bloom filters which 
may have wider applicability (e.g., in the Data 
Warehouse domain). Our future work concerns the 
definition of database design tools to help select the 
hidden part of a database, the inclusion of a cost-
based optimizer, and the possibility of distributed 
design across a variety of smart USB key platforms. 
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